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Monetary Policy and Uncertainty
Paul Jenkins, Deputy Governor and David Longworth, Adviser
• Informulatingmonetarypolicy,centralbanks
must cope with substantial economic
uncertainty.
• Economic uncertainty can arise from different
sources: the state of the economy, the nature of
economic relationships, and the magnitude
and persistence of ongoing shocks.
• The Bank of Canada uses four particular
strategies to deal with economic uncertainty.
First, it brings together a wide range of
information before decisions are made on
setting its interest rate target. Second, it uses
a number of carefully articulated models to
produce economic projections and to examine
alternative scenarios. Third, it chooses
appropriate monetary policy reaction functions
(or “rules”) to use either in one speciﬁc model
or across models. Fourth, it pays particular
attention to the measurement of the output
gap (the difference between output and the
economy’s production potential) and to
alternative measures of pressures on the
economy’s production capacity.
ncertainty regarding what will happen in
the Canadian economy comes in many
forms and from many sources. In conduct-
ing monetary policy, the Bank of Canada
must do its best to deal with this uncertainty, includ-
ing the uncertainty that surrounds the transmission of
its actions throughout the economy.
Experience has shown that there are two important
steps a central bank can take in its conduct of mone-
tary policy to help address uncertainty. First, it should
establish a clear policy objective, and second, it should
operate within a transparent framework for meeting
that objective. Since the adoption of inﬂation targets in
Canada in February 1991, the Bank of Canada has
become increasingly transparent in both its operating
framework and its communications (Thiessen 1995,
2000; Jenkins 2001). The progress made in these areas
has reduced the private sector’s uncertainty about
how the Bank will act in response to economic devel-
opments. Moreover, it has tended to moderate the var-
iability of inﬂation and of other important economic
variables (Dodge 2002; Longworth 2002b).
Nevertheless, numerous types and sources of uncer-
tainty remain. What is the best way for the Bank of
Canada to deal with this uncertainty?
This article looks at examples of uncertainty that the
Bank has encountered in recent years. It then charac-
terizes the different types of uncertainty and reviews
the Bank’s approach to dealing with this problem.
Three subsequent articles in this special issue then
elaborate on three of the major strategies that the Bank
employs in its approach.
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Recent Events as Examples of
Uncertainty
The increased attention being paid to uncertainty in
the conduct of monetary policy reﬂects a number of
developments. In the past 10 years or so, the focus has
shifted from how to achieve low inﬂation to how to
conduct monetary policy in an environment of low
and stable inﬂation. This shift has led to a more sys-
tematic treatment of uncertainty. As well, the tools
that have been developed and improved, such as the
ability to carry out stochastic simulations,1 have
greatly facilitated the analysis and development of
strategies for dealing with uncertainty. Finally, the lib-
eralization of markets, by increasing international
linkages, has added to the potential sources of eco-
nomic and ﬁnancial shocks, and thus to the sources of
uncertainty, facing policy-makers.
Many of the major shocks...over the
past several years have been
international in nature.
Many of the major shocks that the Bank of Canada has
had to contend with over the past several years have
been international in nature. These include the 1997–98
Asian and Russian crises, the deteriorating situation
in Japan, developments in world commodity markets,
the recent global economic slowdown, the “high tech”
bubble of 2000, and the terrorist attacks of September
2001.
In each case, there was uncertainty about the magni-
tude of the effect that these developments would have
on the Canadian economy, as well as uncertainty
about their persistence. In some cases, the uncertainty
was related to the fact that these developments
worked through several channels in their impact on
the Canadian economy. For example, the Asian crisis
had spillover effects on Canada through ﬁnancial
markets, world commodity markets, direct trade
links, and through our trading partners (most impor-
tantly the United States).
1.  In stochastic simulations, economic models are subjected to a series of
random shocks.
The starkest example of the type of uncertainty that
monetary policy has had to confront recently was the
situation immediately after the 11 September 2001 ter-
rorist attacks on the United States. The circumstances
and the uncertainties were unprecedented in North
America. The effects were economic, ﬁnancial, psy-
chological, and geopolitical. Moreover, these effects
exacerbated the considerable uncertainty that accom-
panied the global economic slowdown that began in
late 2000 and gained momentum during 2001.
As a result, in its November 2001 Monetary Policy
Report, the Bank of Canada shifted away from its
usual approach of presenting a base-case projection of
the Canadian economy. Instead, the Bank used a set of
“working assumptions” to present several possible
scenarios. The Report laid out two polar scenarios—
one optimistic, one pessimistic—which depended on
whether household and business conﬁdence
rebounded quickly or remained depressed. Between
these two scenarios, a central scenario featured a
wider-than-usual conﬁdence band to capture the
heightened degree of uncertainty.
These examples underscore how important it is for a
central bank to develop techniques and procedures to
deal with uncertainty when conducting policy. This
involves being clear in its thinking about the different
types of uncertainty that can arise and having the
tools to analyze and form judgments about how to
respond to that uncertainty.
Characterizing Various Types of
Uncertainty
Uncertainty relates to the shocks hitting the economy,
the duration of the shocks, the data that are available,
the size of the parameters in an economic model, and
the models of the economy that are used for analysis.2
Additive-shock uncertainty refers to the randomness in
economic relationships. This randomness has no
implications for policy decision-making in the normal
case.3 In particular, a change in the degree of variabil-
ity of this randomness has no implication for how
decisions should be made. In addition, uncertainty
2.  This section draws heavily on Longworth and Freedman (2000) and on
Freedman (2000).
3.  The normal case is one in which the assumed model is linear and the pol-
icy-maker’s loss function is quadratic (i.e., is a function of the sum of the
squared deviations of variables around their target values). The result stated
in the text is referred to as the “certainty equivalence” result.5 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2002
about the future path of economic variables that are
assumed to evolve independently of the course of the
domestic economy,4 such as foreign variables or cer-
tain domestic ﬁscal variables, is analogous to additive-
shock uncertainty and thus has no implications
for how decisions should be made. In other words,
policy-makers should make their best forecasts of
such variables and ignore the remaining unpredict-
able randomness in decision-making.
In response to uncertainty about the duration of a shock,
policy-makers should base their actions on the typical
persistence of such a shock in the past (which can be
estimated from its historical behaviour, that is, its his-
torical autocorrelations), unless better information is
available. (The risks regarding the persistence of
shocks could be explored by using alternative scenar-
ios that work through the implications of assuming
more or less persistence.) As more information about
4.  These are commonly referred to as “exogenous” variables.
the shock is revealed, policy interest rates should be
adjusted.
Data uncertainty refers to the possibility that data may
be revised or that economic concepts are fundamen-
tally mismeasured. As in the case of additive-shock
uncertainty, the appropriate policy to be pursued is
typically not affected by pure data uncertainty.5 How-
ever, in cases where the central bank chooses to follow
a simple policy interest rate rule that is a function of a
very small number of variables, the coefﬁcients
attached to those variables may be signiﬁcantly
affected by data uncertainty. In particular, the central
bank should typically respond with greater caution to
a variable estimated with error than it would if there
were no data uncertainty. For example, an increase in
uncertainty regarding the output gap would typically
reduce the coefﬁcient on the output gap in the best
simple rule (Rudebusch 2001). The implications of
other types of data uncertainty are dealt with in Box 1.
5.  This holds in linear models when there is no uncertainty about the correct
coefﬁcients in the model.
Box 1
Implications of Other Types of Data Uncertainty
When several indicators are used to assess the
degree of excess demand or supply,1 increased
uncertainty associated with one indicator will lead
to a lower coefﬁcient on that indicator and higher
coefﬁcients on other indicators, in the best mone-
tary rule (Swanson 2000).2 For example, if uncer-
tainty about the size of the output gap increases,
the relative weight on recent deviations of inﬂation
from its target would be increased, and the relative
1.  Some people talk about the uncertainty as to whether a shock is a
demand shock or a supply shock. The way that most models deal with
this is in the treatment of uncertainty about the output gap or other indi-
cators of excess demand and supply.
2.  Svensson and Woodford (2000) deal with a similar problem from the
point of view of indicator variables.
weight on the traditional measure of the output
gap would be decreased. In the limit, a weight of
zero would be placed on the output gap (see, for
example, Leitemo and Lfnning 2001).
Another type of data uncertainty relates to the
equilibrium value of a variable. A data-ﬁltering
technique is often needed to construct the best
measure of that equilibrium. Laubach and Williams
(2001) describe how a particular technique, the
Kalman ﬁlter, can be used to jointly estimate the
equilibrium real interest rate, the trend in the
growth rate of output, and potential output. Vari-
ous ﬁltering techniques used by the Bank of Can-
ada to generate measures of potential output (and
the output gap) are considered later.6 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2002
Parameter uncertainty refers to uncertainty regarding
the numerical values of parameters or coefﬁcients in a
given mathematical model of the economy. Increased
uncertainty about key parameters in the model, such
as the response of output to interest rates and the
response of inﬂation to the output gap, should typi-
cally make policy-makers more cautious (Brainard
1967). See Box 2.
Increased uncertainty about key
parameters in the model . . . should
typically make policy-makers more
cautious.
Model uncertainty relates to more fundamental uncer-
tainty about the structure of the economy than just
parameter uncertainty or data uncertainty. It is
possible, for example, that key elements of the way in
which monetary policy is transmitted through the
stock of money or through credit markets could be
missing from models in which monetary policy works
entirely through its effect on interest rates and
exchange rates. Central banks deal with model uncer-
tainty in two main ways.
In the ﬁrst approach, the results from a number of dif-
ferent models—especially those representing funda-
mentally different paradigms—are examined. Engert
and Selody (1998) and Selody (2001) argue that this
strategy is likely to be useful, especially when the key
behaviours underlying the transmission mechanism
for monetary policy change as the economic environ-
ment changes. When such change occurs, it would be
appropriate to set the monetary policy instrument
according to the optimal path in the model represent-
ing the paradigm that is believed to best capture the
current behaviour of the economy. More generally, the
instrument paths in models representing various par-
adigms could be weighted by the assumed probabili-
ties assigned to those paradigms.
When uncertainty about key parameters (such as
the response of output to interest rates and the
response of inﬂation to the output gap) rises, pol-
icy-makers should typically moderate the changes
in their policy interest rate in response to a given
change in the output gap or to a given change in
the deviation of inﬂation from its target.1 Parame-
ter uncertainty is thus best dealt with by choosing
1.  It is important not to exaggerate the scaling back of this response by
policy-makers. For example, in the simple case, where only the response
of output to the policy interest rate is uncertain, if the response is believed
to be statistically signiﬁcant (i.e., the t-statistic is at least two), one would
scale back the response of the policy interest rate to both the output gap
and the deviation of inﬂation from its target by, at most, 20 per cent, rela-
tive to the case where there was certainty about the parameters. This fol-
lows from the analysis in Brainard (1967).
appropriate coefﬁcients in the reaction function (or
“rule”) for monetary policy in which the policy
interest rate is set as a function of the output gap,
the deviation of inﬂation from the target, and possi-
bly certain other economic variables.
Uncertainty about the response of future inﬂation
to current inﬂation works in the opposite direction
to that of uncertainty about the response of output
to interest rates. That is, greater uncertainty about
the effect of current inﬂation on future inﬂation
should cause policy-makers to strengthen their
response to the output gap and the deviation of
inﬂation from the target. Stronger action will mini-
mize the potential for inﬂation to move away from
its target (Srour 1999).
Box 2
Parameter Uncertainty and Caution in Policy Response7 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2002
In the second, a number of simple monetary policy
rules are speciﬁed, and then their performance across
various models of the economy is examined. If one
particular rule works well in all these models, then it
is said to be robust. The article by Côté et al. in this
issue examines the robustness of certain simple mone-
tary policy rules in various models of the Canadian
economy.6
How the Bank of Canada Deals with
Uncertainty
When making decisions on monetary policy, the Bank
of Canada uses four particular strategies to deal with
the pervasive uncertainty present in the economy.
• It has a process that brings together a
wide range of information before deci-
sions are made regarding the setting of
the target for the overnight interest rate.
• It uses carefully articulated models to
produce economic projections and to
examine alternative assumptions about
key variables.
• It chooses appropriate monetary policy
reaction functions (“rules”) for each
model and uses alternative robust rules.
• It pays particular attention to the meas-
urement of the output gap and to alter-
native measures of pressures on capacity.
Bringing together diverse sources of
information
Given the complexities and uncertainties involved in
the conduct of monetary policy, it is important that
policy-makers have diverse and timely sources of
information concerning the developments and trends
in the economy. These information sources should
include not just quantitative measures of economic
developments and projections but also qualitative
measures that reﬂect the views of a cross-section of
economic agents (individuals, enterprises, and gov-
ernments).
6.  A third strategy found in the literature consists of specifying a simple
model of the economy that captures features of the economy that almost
everyone could agree on and then modelling other plausible descriptions of
the world as varying degrees of autocorrelation in the error terms of the equa-
tions (Sargent 1999). The policy-makers are then assumed to follow a “mini-
max” strategy in which they choose the rule that minimizes the maximum
loss across models (Hansen and Sargent 1998; Sargent 1999).
It is important that policy-makers
have diverse and timely sources of
information concerning the
developments and trends in
the economy.
In broad terms, the Bank relies on four sources of
information (Macklem, this issue) to help it come to
judgments about the economy and the appropriate
stance of policy. First, it uses information on interna-
tional and domestic economic developments in con-
structing its quarterly model-based projections. These
projections are prepared by Bank staff and include the
provision of alternative scenarios to judge the sensi-
tivity of the projection to major risks and uncertain-
ties. Second, it examines data on monetary and credit
aggregates, as well as information on credit spreads
and overall credit conditions. The purpose is to assess
the behaviour of ﬁnancial intermediaries, the ﬁnancial
conditions of households and of the business sector,
and the implications for demand and inﬂation pres-
sures in the economy. Third, the Bank’s regional
ofﬁces conduct regular visits with ﬁrms, associations,
and provincial governments to assess economic devel-
opments. Although qualitative in nature, this informa-
tion is pulled together by the Bank’s regional staff to
provideanimportantadditionalsourceofinformation
about the national economic situation and outlook.
Fourth, the Bank systematically assesses the views of
ﬁnancial markets, particularly in terms of the
expected future movements in the prices and yields of
various ﬁnancial assets.
Using carefully articulated models
The projections produced with the assistance of eco-
nomic models are central in the information consid-
ered. These models incorporate assumptions about
the structure of the economy and how monetary pol-
icy is transmitted throughout the economy (Long-
worth 2000; Longworth and O’Reilly 2002).
The article by Coletti and Murchison in this issue
explains the role of carefully articulated models in
determining the implications of shocks for economic
projections and the setting of interest rates. Models
can be used to consider the implications of alternative8 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2002
assumptions about important variables such as U.S.
demand or oil prices. Coletti and Murchison focus on
the Quarterly Projection Model (QPM), which is the
model used to produce the key staff economic projec-
tion. They also discuss other economic models used in
the process of putting together economic projections,
especially the M1-VECM (Adam and Hendry 2000), a
model that uses a monetary aggregate as a signiﬁcant
part of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Other models used at the Bank, and which are based
primarily on monetary aggregates or ﬁnancial varia-
bles, are surveyed in Maclean (2001) and Longworth
(2002a).
Choosing appropriate monetary policy
reaction functions
Any model built to predict more than a quarter or two
into the future must incorporate the behaviour of the
central bank. This is usually done by including a mone-
tary policy reaction function that explains the setting
of a short-term interest rate as a function of a small
number of macroeconomic variables. Armour and
Côté (1999–2000) have surveyed these reaction func-
tions in the context of inﬂation control. An effective
reaction function is one that keeps inﬂation close to
the target while also keeping output close to its poten-
tial level. 7, 8
As its monetary policy reaction function, the QPM
uses an inﬂation-forecast-based rule, where the future
deviation of core inﬂation from its target is the main
variable driving current interest rates. See Coté et al.
in this issue, for details.
The article by Côté et al. also discusses other monetary
policy reaction functions used at the Bank. In particu-
lar, they report the results of their search for a rule that
would be robust across a wide variety of Canadian
macroeconomic models. Although no rule has been
found to be robust across all models, one particular
7. That is, it leads to a low weighted average of the squared deviation of inﬂa-
tion from the target and the squared deviation of output from potential out-
put (where the weights on the two terms are typically taken to be fairly
similar, perhaps higher on the inﬂation gap in the case of inﬂation-targeting
countries).
8. Some economists also suggest that the volatility of short-term interest rates
should concern policy-makers.
rule was found to perform fairly well in several mod-
els and has been chosen for regular use in the staff
brieﬁngs prior to a ﬁxed announcement date.
Paying attention to the measurement of the
output gap and capacity pressures
In the mainstream economic paradigm incorporated
in the QPM, inﬂation is largely a function of inﬂation
expectations and the output gap. The output gap is
therefore a key variable in understanding the dynam-
ics of inﬂation over time.
The primary measure of the output gap used by Bank
staff is constructed using a variant of the multivariate-
ﬁlter measure described in Butler (1996). Recent
research has also used a Kalman-ﬁlter procedure
(Kichian 1999). Unfortunately, it is notoriously difﬁ-
cult to measure the output gap with a high degree of
accuracy, and many measures of the output gap have
theoretical drawbacks (St-Amant and van Norden
1997; Cayen and van Norden 2002). For these reasons,
the Bank does not come to a view on the degree of
slack in the economy solely on the basis of one meas-
ure. Rather, it uses a wide range of indicators to come
to a consensus as to the likely size of the output gap.
These indicators of capacity pressures include Statis-
tics Canada’s measure of capacity utilization in the
non-farm goods sector; the ratio of unﬁlled orders to
shipments in manufacturing (excluding aerospace
products and parts); measures of overall tightness in
the labour market; measures of labour shortages
(especially for skilled labour); vacancy rates for
ofﬁces, industrial buildings, and apartments; and
reports from the quarterly survey of ﬁrms conducted
by the Bank’s regional ofﬁces. Measures of underlying
inﬂation, cost pressures, inﬂation surprises, and inﬂa-
tion expectations are also used to form a view of
demand pressures on capacity.
* * *
When examined together, the results from these four
strategies provide the Bank with a comprehensive,
balanced view of developments in the Canadian econ-
omy. This approach to dealing with uncertainty is a
critical part of the Bank’s strategy in its conduct of
monetary policy.9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2002
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